Tarski's classical relevant logic TR arises from his work on the foundations of the calculus of relations and on first-order logic restricted to finitely many variables. The theorems of TR are defined here as the formulas whose translations into first-order logic of binary relations can be proved using no more than four variables from the assumptions that all the relations are dense and commute under composition. Its rules are determined similarly.
Introduction
In 1975, Alfred Tarski delivered a pair of lectures on relation algebras at the University of Campinas. At the end of his second lecture, Tarski said, that these are not all equations which are needed to obtain representation theorems, this means, to obtain the algebraic expression of first-order logic with two-place predicate, if we know that this is not an adequate expression of this logic, then why restrict oneself to these equations? Why not to add strictly some other equations which hold in representable relation algebras or maybe all?"
The answer is that Tarski's definition of relation algebras axiomatizes the equations provable with 4 variables (Theorem 5 in §9). Since Tarski was axiomatizing the calculus of relations, he had to choose axioms that are true under the formulas-as-relations interpretation in which variables denote binary relations and operation symbols denote operations on relations. Since Meyer and Routley use the same operations as relation algebras, the formulasas-relations interpretation can be applied to their classical relevant logic CR * , as is done in Table 1 . The formulas-as-relations interpretation generalizes the formulas-as-classes interpretation, but reduces to it when the base set U has only one element. Interpreting formulas as binary relations on a one-element set leads to classical propositional calculus. A formula A is valid (under the formulas-as-relations interpretation) if A denotes a relation containing the identity relation t whenever its variables are mapped to relations. Every for- Table 1 Operations for interpreting formulas as relations on a base set U mula in CR * is valid if the variables are restricted to range over a collection of dense relations that commute under fusion. More generally, if A ∈ CR * then t ≤ A is true in every commutative dense relation algebra. The converse fails since, as Dunn [6] pointed out, the atom structures of relation algebras satisfy the frame condition Rabc ⇒ Rb * a * c * , called "tagging", which corresponds to Tarski's axiom (R 9 ) in Table 6 . Dunn said (R 9 )
"does not correspond to any formula in the primitive vocabulary of R, nor do I know of any such formula that it implies which is not also a theorem of R. So we are left with a nagging question." [6, p. 104] By Theorem 14 in §17, formula (41) is in the primitive vocabulary of R, is not a theorem of R, and is valid in a model structure if and only if the structure satisfies Ra * bc ⇒ Racb, a frame condition equivalent to tagging in the presence of the postulates for CR * -model structures in §12. Formula (41) happens to be 3-provable. Tarski had asked whether simply removing the associative law would axiomatize the 3-provable equations. The answer is no, but the 3-provable equations can be axiomatized by weakening the associative law to a 3-provable version called the semi-associative law (Theorem 4 in §9). We define Tarski's 3-variable classical relevant logic CT 3 as the formulas provable with 3 variables, while CT 4 is set of formulas provable with 4 variables. Then (41) is in CT 3 but not CR * . § §2-9 summarize Tarski's work on the foundations of the calculus of relations and logic with finitely many variables. The details are taken from [37] . §2 presents first order logic L, which is extended to L + in §3. These two formalisms are seen to be equipollent in §4. The equational formalism L × appears in §5 and is compared to L + in §6, where relation algebras RA, representable relation algebras RRA, and equational logic are reviewed.
Tarski's 3-variable formalisms L + 3 and L 3 are presented in §7, and are seen to be equipollent with L × in §8. These formalisms include the associative law, which requires four variables to prove. Weakening it to the semi-associative law produces the equational formalism Lw × , seen to be equipollent to the standardized 3-variable formalisms L s and L + s in §9. Tarski's relevance logics are defined in §10 and characterized in §13 in terms of provability (using results from §8 and §9), sequent calculus (presented in §11), and model structures (discussed in §12). Many formulas and derived rules of inference for CT 3 are listed in §14. §15 has formulas that are in CT 4 (4-provable) but not CT 3 (3-provable), such as the associative law for fusion. §16 has formulas of R that hold only when fusion is commutative. §17 presents a formula that is in T 3 , is not in R, answers Dunn's question, and disproves a theorem of Kowalski (see §18). §19 has formulas in CT 5 \ CT 4 . §20 defines TR, a proper extension of CT 4 and CR * . §21 links KR to symmetric dense relation algebras. §22 characterizes the Dunn-McColl logic RM as an extension of T 4 . §23 has a concluding discussion and some questions.
First order logic L of binary relations
For Tarski and Givant, L is a first-order language with equality symbol • 1 and exactly one binary relation symbol E, while M (n) is a first-order language with equality • 1 and exactly n binary relation symbols, n ≥ 0. We assume instead that 1 , is the equality symbol of L and that L has a countable infinite set Π of binary relation symbols (including 1 , ), but no function symbols or constants. The elements of Π are called atomic predicates, and those that are distinct from 1 , are also called propositional variables. The connectives of L are implication ⇒ and negation ¬, and the quantifier is ∀. The atomic formulas of L are the ones of the form xAy, where x, y are variables and A ∈ Π is an atomic predicate. For example, x1 , y is an atomic formula since 1 , ∈ Π. The set of formulas of L is Φ, defined as the intersection of every set that contains the atomic formulas and includes ϕ ⇒ ψ, ¬ϕ, and ∀ x ϕ for every variable x whenever it contains ϕ and ψ. The set of sentences of L (formulas with no free variables) is Σ. The connectives ∨, ∧, ⇔, and quantifier ∃ are defined on formulas
In formulating axioms and deductive rules for L, Tarski and Givant [37, p. 8] adopted the system S 1 of Tarski [36] , which provides axioms for the logically valid sentences and requires only the rule MP of modus ponens (to infer B from A → B and A). Tarski's system S 2 provides axioms for the logically valid formulas (not just the sentences), and uses the rule of generalization (to infer ∀ x ϕ from ϕ) as well as MP. The systems S 1 and S 2 in Tarski [36] were obtained by modifying a system of Quine [31, 32, 33, 34] which also uses only MP. Tarski's systems avoid the notion of substitution. Henkin [10, 11] Table 3 . If Ψ ⊆ Σ, then a sentence ϕ ∈ Σ is provable in L from Ψ , written Ψ ⊢ ϕ or ⊢ ϕ if Ψ = ∅, iff ϕ is in the intersection of all sets that contain Ψ and the axioms of L, and are closed under MP. Two formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ are provably equivalent in L, written ϕ ≡ ψ, if {ϕ} ⊢ ψ and {ψ} ⊢ ϕ.
3 Extending L to L + Tarski and Givant extend L to L + by adding two binary and two unary operators that act on relation symbols and produce new relation symbols. Π + , the set of predicates of L + , is the intersection of every set containing Π that also contains A + B, A, A;B, and A −1 whenever it contains A and B. Predicates obtained in distinct ways are distinct, so, for example, if A + B = C + D then A = C and B = D. They add a second equality symbol ≖
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and ψ is obtained from ϕ by replacing a single occurrence of x by y. 4 Equipollence of L and L + L and L + are expressively and deductively equipollent. To prove this, Tarski recursively defined a translation (or elimination) mapping G from formulas of L + to (what turn out to be logically equivalent) formulas of L [37, 2.3(iii)]. G eliminates operators in accordance with the definitional axioms (DI)-(DV). If ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ + , x, y are variables, and A, B are relation symbols of L + , then the conditions determining G are shown in Table 5 . From the first four conditions it follows that G leaves formulas of L unchanged. The next result states that L is a subformalism of L + , and L is expressively and deductively equipollent with L + . Part (4) is the main mapping theorem for L and L + .
where z is the first variable distinct from x, y,
where x, y are the first two variables. Table 5 Definition of elimination mapping G : Φ + → Φ.
Equational formalism L ×
Tarski and Givant define a formalism L × with equational axioms and deductive rules for equality. The axioms of L × are (R 1 )-(R 10 ), where A, B, C ∈ Π + , shown in Table 6 . (R 1 )-(R 10 ) are the axioms for relation algebras. De- 6 Comparing L × with L + L × is a subformalism of L + ; it has a subset of its sentences, Σ × ⊆ Σ + , and it is easy to prove, using the completeness of Tarski's axiomatization, that provability in L × implies provability in L + . L × is weaker than L and L + in means of expression. This is due to Korselt's result, reported by Löwenheim [15] , that no equation in Σ × is logically equivalent to a sentence asserting the existence of four distinct objects, such as
Korselt's theorem was greatly generalized by Tarski [37, 3.5(viii) ]. Tarski knew only that he could prove in L × the "hundreds of theorems" of Schröder. Does he still need L + ? Is every equation provable in L + already provable in L × ? Tarski wrote in the early 1940s, "It seems very probable that the answer to these questions is affirmative" [35, p. 169 ]. To make sense of these problems, define the predicate algebra to be
Let A be an algebra with the same similarity type as P, say
where S is a set, 1 , ∈ S, + and ; are binary operations on S, and and 
For example, the relations <, >, ≤, and ≥ on the rationals Q are called dense linear orderings because they satisfy the equation A ≤ A;A, which asserts that between any two rationals there is another. Along with the empty relation ∅, universal relation Q 2 , diversity relation =, and identity relation =, they form an 8-element commutative dense relation algebra called the Point Algebra. Belnap's M 0 [3] is obtained by using only the operations ∨, ∧, →, and ∼ from The next lemma, a special case of the completeness theorem for equational logic, provides the link between relation algebras and deducibility in L × . Proof. Let Θ be the set of equations true in every RA. By the definition of RA, the axioms (R 1 )-(R 10 ) are in Θ. Next we show that Θ is closed under the rules Trans and Repl. To see this for Trans, assume A ≖ C and B ≖ C are in Θ. We must show A ≖ B is in Θ, so assume that we have a homomorphism h :
To show the conclusions of Repl are in Θ, we assume that we have a homomorphism h : For the converse, we need to construct quotient algebras of P. Define the binary relation
Because of the rules Trans and Repl, ≈ × is a congruence relation on P, and so it determines a quotient homomorphism q : Π + → {A/≈ × : A ∈ Π + } that carries each predicate A to its equivalence class A/≈ × under ≈ × . The quotient algebra P/≈ × is a relation algebra. To show this, we assume k : P → P/≈ × is a homomorphism and show for any axiom A ≖ B that k(A) = k(B). We do just one example, say an instance A + B ≖ B + A of (R 1 ). There are C, D ∈ Π + such that k(A) = C/≈ × and k(B) = D/≈ × , so
Proofs for the other axioms are similar. Now suppose that A ≖ B is not provable in L × . We wish to show it is not in Θ, i.e., there is some A ∈ RA and some homomorphism h : P → A such that h(A) = h(B). Let A = P/≈ × ∈ RA and h(C) = C/≈ × for every C ∈ Π + . Since A ≖ B is not provable, the equivalence classes A/≈ × and B/≈ × are distinct, hence h(A) = h(B) and the equation is not true in every RA because it fails in A.
A relation algebra
is union, is complementation with respect to E, ; is relative multiplication, −1 is converse, and 1 , is the identity part of E,
A relation algebra is representable if it is isomorphic to a proper relation algebra. Let RA be the class of relation algebras, and let RRA be the class of representable relation algebras. Since Tarski's axioms (R 1 )-(R 10 ) hold for binary relations, RRA ⊆ RA. An equivalent way to ask Tarski's question is, are RRA and RA the same? If a relation algebra A is representable, then for all A, B ∈ Π + and every homomorphism h :
There is an easy proof of this using the completeness theorem for L (and the assumption that Π has countably many relation symbols, by the way). Therefore, if A is a non-representable relation algebra, there are A,
i.e., some equation is provable in L + but not L × , answering Tarski's question in the negative.
There are countably many relation symbols in Π, so any non-representable relation algebra suffices to show L × is weaker than L + in means of proof. The first to find an algebra in RA \ RRA was Lyndon [16] . However, since Tarski and Givant assume L has exactly one binary relation symbol besides equality, they need a non-representable relation algebra generated by a single element. The non-representable relation algebra found by McKenzie [27] has this property. Givant used it to construct an equation, simplified later by George McNulty and Tarski, that is provable in L + but not in L × [37, 3.4(vi) and p. 54].
7 Three-variable formalisms L + 3 and L 3 L × is weaker than L + and L. In fact, L × seems to be correlated with the logic of three variables, since Korselt's sentence uses four variables, while G(A ≖ B) contains at most three. Indeed, for every A, B ∈ Π + , it is apparent from the definition of G that if neither A nor B contains an occurrence of ;, then G(A ≖ B) has only the first two variables occurring in it, while if ; occurs in A or B, then G(A ≖ B) has the first three variables in it. This suggests that perhaps every sentence containing only the first three variables is logically equivalent to an equation in Σ × . Tarski was able to show that this is actually the case. For every finite n ≥ 3 let Φ + n be the set of formulas in Φ + that contain only the first n variables, and let
Tarski's theorem that every sentence in Σ + 3 is logically equivalent to an equation in Σ × suggests that Σ + 3 could be the set of sentences of a formalism L + 3 , equipollent with L × in means of proof as well as expression, and also equipollent with a subformalism L 3 of L having Σ 3 as its set of sentences and the restriction of G to Σ + 3 as the translation mapping between L + 3 of L 3 . Tarski's initial proposal came in two parts. First, Tarski proposed restricting the axioms (AI)-(AIX) and the rule MP to those instances that belong to Σ + 3 . Givant found these restricted axioms were too weak and suggested replacing (AIX) with (AIX ′ ), called the general Leibniz law, which is formulated in terms of a variant type of substitution defined by Tarski-Givant [37, pp. 66-67]:
The variant substitution is somewhat involved, so Tarski and Givant borrowed an idea from [18] to formulate an alternate axiom schema (AIX ′′ ). For any two variables x, y, let S xy ϕ be the result of interchanging variables x and y throughout formula ϕ. The function S xy : Φ + → Φ + is determined by these rules:
Givant proved that the following variant of (AIX ′ ) can be used instead of (AIX ′ ) in the axiomatization of L + 3 .
[
Tarski knew by the early 1940s that (R 4 ) could not be proved with only three variables, and would have to be included in the axiomatization of L + 3 by fiat. The second part of Tarski's proposal was to include the general associativity schema:
(AX)
This schema involves the complicated substitution, but Givant proved it could be replaced by the following variant of (AX), in which the free variables of formulas ϕ, ψ, ξ are just x and y,
The sets of sentences of L + 3 and L 3 are Σ + 3 and Σ 3 , respectively, their axioms are the sentences in Σ + 3 and Σ 3 , respectively, that are instances of (AI)-(AVIII), (AIX ′ ), or (AX), and their rule of inference is MP. For simpler axiom sets, use (AIX ′′ ) and (AX ′ ) instead of (AIX ′ ) and (AX). For any 
For the equipollence of L 3 and L × Tarski and Givant define a recursive function H : Φ + 3 → Φ + 3 [37, 3.9(iii)]. However, concerning H they said, " The construction used here to establish these equipollence results has clearly some serious defects, . . . The splintered character of the definition of the translation mapping H, . . . the involved notion of substitution . . . is another detrimental factor. As a final result, the construction is so cumbersome . . . in the proofs . . . that we did not even attempt to present them in full. A different construction that would remove most of the present defects would be very desirable indeed." [37, p. 87] For another description of H see [8] . For two simpler alternative constructions see [24, Theorem 552 and pp. 548-550]. The key equipollence results, including the two main mapping theorems, are listed here.
Theorem 3. [37, §3.9] Formalisms L × and L + 3 are equipollent.
9 Equipollence of Lw × , L s , and L + s Since Tarski and Givant included (AX) only to achieve equipollence, they defined the "(standardized ) formalisms" Ls 3 and Ls + 3 , obtained by deleting (AX) from the axiom sets of L 3 and L + 3 , and said, "These standardized formalisms are undoubtedly more natural and more interesting in their own right than L 3 and L + 3 ." [37, p. 89]. They asked, would deleting (R 4 ) from the axioms of L × produce a formalism equipollent with the standardized formalisms Ls 3 and Ls + 3 ? The answer is "no", because the semi-associative law
, , is provable in Ls + 3 but cannot be derived from the remaining axioms (R 1 )-(R 3 ) and (R 5 )-(R 10 ). Another example of an equation provable in Ls + 3 but not from the remaining axioms is
Adding either one of these as an axiom produces a formalism equipollent with standardized 3-variable logic. Therefore Tarski and Givant defined Lw × as the "weakened" formalism obtained by replacing (
). This is the axiom set for the class SA of semi-associative relation algebras. For any 
Tarski-Givant [37, p. 91 ] also define formalisms L n and L + n for every finite n ≥ 4, imitating the definitions of Ls 3 and Ls + 3 , but with n in place of 3. Thus the sets of formulas of L n and L + n are Φ n and Φ + n , the sets of sentences are Σ n and Σ + n , the sets of axioms are those instances of axiom schemata (AI)-(AVIII) and (AIX ′ ) that lie in Σ n and Σ + n , and the only rule of inference is MP.
The next theorem involves the first of these formalisms, when n = 4. As was noted by Tarski-Givant [37, p. 92], Theorem 5 tells us that a 3variable sentence can be proved with 4 variables if and only if it can be proved with 3 variables together with the assumption that relative multiplication is associative, and an equation is true in every relation algebra if and only if it can be proved with 4 variables. To Tarski's question, whether the definition of RA "is justified in any intrinsic sense," Theorem 5(3) answers, "Tarski's axioms for RA characterize the equations provable with four variables". We can informally express the theorem as a slogan:
"True in RA = 4-provable = 3-provable with associativity."
10 Tarski's relevance logics T n and CT n , 3 ≤ n ≤ ω Let →, ∼, and • be operators on Π + defined in the predicate algebra P by
According to Dunn's posted comments in 1992, he wanted to avoid this definition of residual →, because "a 'random' converse is thrown in . . . that would lead to some undesirable properties in relevance logic", but he noted many sources for interpreting De Morgan negation as converse-complementation. Fusion is order-reversed relative multiplication, but this distinction can be ignored for systems in which it is commutative. The symbols ∨ and ∧ have already appeared as connectives in L, but will also be used here to denote operators on Π + defined by
For their classical relevant logics, Routley and Meyer introduce Boolean negation ¬ (designated by a symbol already used to denote negation in L but given a second meaning here) and the Routley star * , defined by
These definitions produce the standard connection between → and •,
and match the interpretations in 
and Tarski's Ψ -based relevance logic of n variables is
The equations in Ψ are the non-logical assumptions. We omit reference to Ψ when it is empty.
Sequent calculus
The sequent calculus (for proving formulas in first-order logic) and model structures (for the semantic characterization of various relevance logics) are presented here and in the next section. They are used in Theorems 9 and 10 below to characterize CT 3 and CT 4 . Assume n ≥ 3. An n-sequent is an ordered pair Γ, ∆ of sets Γ, ∆ ⊆ Φ n of atomic formulas of L n , written Γ | ∆. We say Γ | ∆ is an Axiom if Γ ∩ ∆ = ∅ or x1 , x ∈ ∆ for some variable x. If Ψ is a set of n-sequents, then a sequent is n-provable from Ψ (just n-provable when Ψ = ∅) if it is contained in every set of n-sequents that includes Ψ and the Axioms, and is closed under the rules of inference in Table 7 . In these rules, Γ, Γ ′ , ∆, ∆ ′ ⊆ Φ n are sets of atomic formulas, A, B ∈ Π + are predicates, and x, y, z are among the first n variables. The notation "no y" in rule ;| means that y = x, z and y does not occur in any formula in Γ or ∆. The rules are taken from [20] but use notation for the classical relevant logic operators. The rules |∧ and ∧| are derived from the rules for ¬ and ∨ through the definition of ∧. In the notation for sequents, braces are frequently omitted. By [20, Theorem 2] , the Proof. The sequence of sequents in Table 8 shows that yF x | yGx is 3provable. Only the first three variables x, y, z appear in any of the sequents. Sequents 1, 2, 4, and 6 are Axioms. Every other sequent is 3-provable because it is the conclusion of an instance of a rule of inference whose hypotheses are one or two previous sequents. For example, sequent 3 is 3-provable because it is the conclusion of an instance of rule | ; whose hypotheses are the 3-provable sequents 1 and 2. The proof is a formalization of the following informal argument that, for binary relations A, B, C, D, Proof. There are four directions. If one of the four sequents is 3-provable by some sequence of sequents, one can then add sequents, ending up with one of the other sequents, which is therefore also 3-provable. The first pair of sequents is handled in Table 9 , the second in Table 10 . 
Model structures
A model structure is a quadruple K = K, R, * , I consisting of a set K, a ternary relation R ⊆ K 3 , a unary operation * : K → K, and a subset I ⊆ K.
The associated complex algebra of K is Cm (K) = ℘(K), ∪, , ;, −1 , I , where ℘(K) is the set of subsets of K, and the operations ∪, , ;, and −1 , are defined on subsets X, Y ⊆ K by 
x, y * = y, x for all x, y ∈ U , (star)
Then Re(U ), the algebra of binary relations on U , is the complex algebra of the model structure of pairs on U , Re(U ) = Cm (U). Consider the following conditions on a model structure K, written in the first order language of one ternary relation symbol R, one unary function symbol * , and one unary relation symbol I:
x * = x.
(symm)
The first five conditions characterize the model structures whose complex algebras are relation algebras or semi-associative relation algebras. For example, they hold in the model structure of pairs on any set. The last three conditions hold when the algebras are commutative, dense, or symmetric. 
The classical relevant logic CR * is defined as the set of formulas valid in all CR * -model structures. These structures are commutative because Lemma 5. If K = K, R, * , I is a model structure such that I = {0}, p1, and p2, then (comm).
Proof. Assume Rabc. Get R0aa by p1. By p2, R0aa and Rabc imply there is some y such that R0by and Ryac. However, R0by implies b = y by p1, so Rbac.
When (comm) holds, we can restate p5 in two ways, by switching the order of the first two entries in the conclusion, or interchanging a and b in the conclusion.
Rabc ⇒ Rbc * a * , (l-rot) Rabc ⇒ Rc * ab * .
(r-rot)
In the presence of p1 and p2, the three postulates p5, (r-rot), (l-rot) are equivalent.
Theorem 8. Assume K = K, R, * , I , I = {0}, and Cm (K) is a commutative dense relation algebra. Then K is a CR * -model structure. A is integral if 0 = 1 and x;y = 0 implies x = 0 or y = 0. By [24, Theorem 379(iii)] or [18, Theorem 7(20) ] or [23, Theorem 29] , A is simple if and only if 0 = 1, and for all x, y ∈ A, if 0 = (x;1);y then x = 0 or y = 0. Suppose A ∈ SA is commutative and simple. We get 0 = 1 from simplicity, and if x;y = 0, then (x;1);y = (1;x);y = 1;(x;y) = 1;0 = 0 by commutativity and [24, (6. 188)], hence x = 0 or y = 0 by simplicity. This shows A is integral, so we conclude 1
, is an atom of A by [24, Theorem 353] . Every commutative semi-associative relation algebra is isomorphic to a subdirect product of algebras in which 1 , is an atom. For a special case of this situation, assume we have a model structure K = K, R, * , I such that Cm (K) is a commutative semi-associative relation algebra, or equivalently, K satisfies (l-refl), (r-refl), (ident), (semi-Pasch), and (comm). For every u ∈ I, let K u = K ;{u} = {u};K. Then {K u : u ∈ I} is a partition of K and {R ∩ (K u ) 3 : u ∈ I} is a partition of R. Each K u is an ideal element of Cm (K) and is closed under * , so we may let K u = K u , R ∩ K 3 u , * | Ku , {u} . Then Cm (K) is isomorphic to a subalgebra of the direct product u∈I Cm (K u ). Since validity in K is equivalent to validity in Cm (K u ) for every u ∈ I, it follows that, when checking whether a formula is true in every commutative semi-associative relation algebra, it suffices to check those in which the identity element is an atom. Model structures whose complex algebras are commutative dense integral relation algebras are CR *model structures (but not conversely; see Theorem 14) . 13 Characterizing CT 3 and CT 4 Theorem 9. For every A ∈ Π + , the following statements are equivalent. Proof. Parts (1) and (2) are equivalent by definition. Parts (2) and (3) are equivalent by Theorem 4(4). Parts (3) and (4) 
5.
A is valid in model structures satisfying (l-refl), (r-refl), (ident), (Pasch), 6. the sequent | xAx is provable in the 4-variable sequent calculus,
Proof. Parts (1) and (2) are equivalent by definition. Parts (2) and (3) are equivalent by Theorem 5 (3) . Parts (3) and (4) are equivalent by Lemma 1. Parts (4) and (5) are equivalent by Theorem 6(2). Parts (4) and (6) are equivalent by [20, Theorems 2 and 6(2)] and Lemma 3. Part (8) is equivalent to (2) by Theorem 5(1), equivalent to (3) by Theorem 3 (5) , and equivalent to (9) by Theorem 2 (5) . Finally, (7) and (9) are equivalent by Theorem 5(2).
Theorems and rules of CT 3
To show A ∈ CT 3 , it is enough by Theorem 9 to show | xAx is 3-provable, but three variables may not all be needed. This leads to a classification of formulas and rules according to the number of variables needed to prove them. For example, the sequent | x1 , x is provable because it is an Axiom, and it is 1-provable because it contains only one variable. Therefore 1 , is 1provable. Similarly, xAx | xAx is provable because it is an Axiom, and it is 1-provable. By Rule |¬, the sequent | xAx, x¬Ax is also 1-provable. Then by Rule |∨, | xA ∨ ¬Ax is 1-provable, hence A ∨ ¬A ∈ CT 3 . Therefore A ∨ ¬A is 1-provable. The Rule of Disjunctive Syllogism is 1-provable, in the sense that, assuming | xA ∨ Bx and | x∼Ax are 3-provable, we do not need to introduce any additional variables to conclude that | xBx is 3-provable. If one more variable besides x is used, the rule is said to be 2-provable. In the next theorem, probably every formula (except (41)) is in CR * , and probably every derived rule also applies to CR * .
Theorem 11. Among the theorems and derived rules of CT 3 , classified by the number of variables needed for their proofs, there are 1-provable formulas in CT 3 ,
2-provable formulas in CT 3 ,
3-provable formulas in CT 3 ,
and 3-provable rules of CT 3 , 
A non-associative commutative dense SA
This section presents formulas that are valid for all relations but require 4 variables to prove.
Theorem 12. Formulas (63)-(67) are in CR * and CT 4 but not CT 3 .
Proof. To show formulas (63)-(67) belong to CR * it suffices to check that they are valid in all CR * -model structures. They can be shown to be in CT 4 by deriving them from the axioms for relation algebras or proving them in the 4-variable sequent calculus. For example, by Theorem 10 and Lemma 3, (67) is in CT 4 because of the following sequence of sequents. To show formulas (63)-(67) cannot be proved with three variables, we use a dense semi-associative relation algebra that is not associative. Let
Rxyz means z ∈ {x};{y}, and ; is defined in 
Proof. Let K 2 = K, R, * , {1 , } be the model structure determined by K =
{1
, , a, b, b * }, 1 , * = 1 , , a * = a, (b * ) * = b, R ⊆ K 3 , and Rxyz holds iff z ∈ {x};{y}, where ; is specified in Table 12 . One may check that K 2 satisfies Table 12 The atom structure of a non-commutative dense representable relation algebra the conditions required to conclude Cm (K 2 ) ∈ RA by Theorem 6(2). Note that K 2 is also dense, i.e., it satisfies Rxxx. On the other hand, Cm (K 2 ) is not commutative, so Contraposition (68), Permutation (69), Suffixing (70), and Modus Ponens (71) are invalid. These formulas are invalidated in many ways, but in rather few ways if the propositional variables are mapped to singletons and the formulas are mapped to the empty set. A complete list of such valuations has been calculated with GAP [7] . In Table 13 we list two to four assignments under which each formula evaluates to ∅ and is therefore invalid in K 2 . To prove Contraposition (68), Permutation (69), Suffixing (70), and Modus Ponens (71) are not in CT ω it suffices to show Cm (K 2 ) is isomorphic to a proper relation algebra. A finite sequence is a function f with domain dom(f ) = {1, · · · , n} for some finite non-zero n. Let Q be the set of rational numbers. Let U be the set of finite sequences of rational numbers. Define a binary relation B ⊆ U × U for f, g ∈ U by f Bg (we say f is below g or f comes before g) iff for some finite n > 0, dom(f ) = {1, · · · , n} ⊆ dom(g), f i = g i for all i < n, and f n < g n . Let
Then ρ is an isomorphism from Cm (K 2 ) onto a proper relation algebra, hence every formula in CT ω is valid in K 2 . Since (68)-(71) are not valid in K 2 , they are not in CT ω .
A formula in T 3 \ CR *
Theorem 14 shows that (41) is not in CR * and that it is equivalent to a model structure property. and K = K, R, * , I is a model structure. Then
Proof (1). F → G ∈ CT 3 by Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Theorem 9(1)(6), so
Proof (2) . To show F → G / ∈ CR * , we use a model structure whose complex algebra is a Meyer monoid that is not a relation algebra. Let I = {1
, } and
, , a, a * } where 1 , * = 1 , and (a * ) * = a. Let K 3 is a CR * -model structure, so everything in CR * is valid in K 3 . Tagging, (l-refl ′ ), (l-refl), and (r-refl) all fail because a, a, a * ∈ R but a * , a * , a / ∈ R. Choose a homomorphism h : P → Cm (K 3 ) from the predicate algebra into the complex algebra of 
Proof (3) . Assume K satisfies (l-refl ′ ). We wish to prove F ≤ G is true in 
The contrapositive of what we have just proved is that if F ≤ G is true in the complex algebra of a model structure K, then K satisfies (l-refl ′ ).
As part of the proof of [4, Lemma 6.5] it is stated that there are CR *model structures in which tagging fails. No example is given, but K 3 can be used.
Counterexample to a theorem of Kowalski
According to [14, Theorem 8.1] , R is "complete with respect to squareincreasing, commutative, integral relation algebras." However, R does not contain all the formulas true in this class of algebras. By Theorem 14, (41) is not a theorem of R, but it is in T 3 and is therefore is true in all semiassociative relation algebras, including all square-increasing, commutative, integral relation algebras. Thus (41) is a counterexample to [14, Theorem 8.1] , which was obtained as an immediate consequence of [14, Theorem 7.1] , that every normal De Morgan monoid is embeddable in a square-increasing, commutative, integral relation algebra. However, the complex algebra of K 3 is a counterexample, since K 3 fails to satisfy tagging, it but would have to do so if Cm (K 3 ) were embedded in a relation algebra. The difficulty seems to arise in the proof of [14, Lemma 5.4(1) ].
Formulas in T 5 \ CT 4
We present just two examples of formulas requiring five variables to prove. The second one (73) is a consequence of a formula that expresses DesArgues Theorem when A, B, · · · are points and A;B is the set of points on the line passing through A and B. Mikulás [30] proved that T ω is not finitely axiomatizable by constructing infinitely many more formulas requiring arbitrarily large numbers of variables to prove. (72) and (73) are binary relations that contain the identity relation. In both cases a straightforward proof of this fact only refers to five objects. Two are assumed to be in the relation denoted by the left-hand side, and there are three more corresponding to the occurrences of ; in the left-hand side. The proof consists of assembling facts expressed by the right-hand side from the assumptions that five objects are related to each other by six or seven binary relations in ways described by the left-hand side. The proofs are similar to, but more elaborate, than the proofs in Table 8 The proof shows there are 3-predicate instances of (72) and (73) , the probability that a randomly selected finite relation algebra with n atoms is integral and symmetric approaches 100% as n → ∞. Since symmetry implies commutativity, almost every finite relation algebra is commutative. The probability of being dense falls to zero, since one expects only about half of the atoms to be dense. Instead of choosing from all finite relation algebras, one may choose from just the dense ones. A randomly selected finite dense relation algebra will almost certainly be integral and symmetric, hence also commutative. Therefore the atom structure of a randomly selected finite dense relation algebra is almost certainly a KR-model structure. A slight reworking of the proof of [21, Theorem 12] shows that the number of KR-model structures with n elements is asymptotic to
i.e., the ratio of κ(n) to the actual number approaches 1 as n → ∞. At my first meeting with Alasdair Urquhart, in the late 1970s or a little later, we discussed how easy it is to construct finite relation algebras and relevant model structures.
For any finite dimension d ≥ 3 chosen in advance, a randomly selected finite dense relation algebra will almost certainly be in RA d , the variety whose equational theory consists of all equations that are d-provable (see §11). Every finite subset of the equational theory of RRA is included in the equational theory of RA d for some finite d ≥ 3. Therefore, for any finite set of equations that are true in all representable relation algebras, a randomly selected finite dense relation algebra will almost certainly satisfy all of them [21, Theorem 15] , as well as be symmetric, integral, and commutative. This suggests (but does not prove) that almost every finite dense relation algebra is representable.
RM, an extension of T 4
Interpreting formulas as relations leads naturally to classifying formulas according to what they say about relations. Some formulas express logical laws, such as A → A, which asserts that the relation A is a subset of itself. Other formulas amount to non-logical assumptions, i.e., assumptions about relations that may not be universally true. For example, A → A • A holds when A is dense. By expressing fusion • with negation ∼ and implication → and taking the contrapositive we get Reductio (A → ∼A) → ∼A, another formula that says A is dense.
When we defined TR, we adopted non-logical assumptions of commutativy and density and restricted the logical apparatus to four variables. The resulting logic contains all of classical relevant logic CR * , and actually excedes it by one formula (41) and one postulate (l-refl ′ ). This difference is eliminated in KR, the result of adding a * = a to CR * or adding A * ≖ A to TR. The key feature is the restriction to four variables. Thus TR has nonlogical assumptions of commutativity and density, while KR has non-logical assumptions of symmetry and density, but in both cases we restrict the logical apparatus to four variables. This restriction is required to characterize KR because by Theorem 15 there are 5-provable formulas that are not in KR.
No such restriction is needed for RM, the Dunn-McColl logic R-mingle, obtained by adding the mingle axiom A → (A → A) to R. Under the formulas-as-relations interpretation, A → (A → A) is valid if and only if A is transitive. The connectives of RM are ∧, ∨, →, and ∼, the non-logical assumptions are commutativity, density, and transitivity, and the logical apparatus is not restricted. There are infinitely many variables available to prove consequences of the non-logical assumptions. Meyer [1, p. 413, Corollary 3.1] proved that the finite normal Sugihara lattices are characteristic for RM. By [25, Theorem 6.2(i)], every finite normal Sugihara lattice is isomorphic to an algebra whose universe is a set K of transitive dense binary relations on a set U , such that K is closed under the operations ∧, ∨, →, and ∼ in Table 1 , and K is commutative under fusion. This completeness and representability of normal Sugihara lattices has the following consequence. (3)] is a claim about atoms that happens to be false but is proved for elements. It would also have precluded Theorem 18.
Conclusion and questions
Starting with →, the vocabulary of relevance logic grew until, in the classical relevant logic of Meyer and Routley, it was the same as the relation algebras of Tarski. Meyer and Routley stopped one formula and one property short of Tarski, by missing (41) and (l-refl ′ ). Meyer and Routley included commutativity and density for good historical and logical reasons, but Tarski had no reason to restrict his axiomatization of the calculus of relations to those that are dense and commute under composition. The definition of TR takes both steps. TR contains everything 4-provable, including a 3-provable formula missing from CR * , plus everything true in all commutative dense relation algebras. When formulas are interpreted as relations, both the logic TR and the equational theory of commutative dense relation algebras may be characterized as whatever is 4-provable from commutativity and density. Similarly, KR and the equational theory of symmetric dense relation algebras are characterized as whatever is 4-provable from symmetry and density. Finally, RM and the equational theory of sets of transitive dense relations, closed under ∧, ∨, →, and ∼ from Table 1 and commuting under •, are characterized as everything in the relevant vocabulary that is ω-provable from transitivity, density, and commutativity. In the case of TR and KR, there are two increasing chains of extensions obtained by allowing more variables, i.e., by relaxing the restrictions on the logical apparatus while retaining the non-logical assumptions. The chains approach CT Ψ ω , where Ψ is the set of non-logical assumptions, either commutativity and density in the case of TR, or symmetry and density for KR. RM already contains CT ω . These extensions are significant because if a model structure K validates CT ω then it has a complex algebra that is a simple representable relation algebra and therefore can be embedded in the complex algebra of the model structure U of pairs on some set U (see §12), with the advantage that the ternary relation of U is (triples) and its Routley star is (star). Although (72) and (73) can fail to be valid in the atom structure of a non-representable relation algebra, such as the one in Table 15 , they are valid in every model structure of pairs and are in CT ω (in fact, CT 5 ), so a randomly selected dense relation algebra will almost certainly have an atom structure in which (72) and (73) are valid. They are not always valid, but almost always.
In all this, the target is U, the model structure of pairs on U . Although U may have never been mentioned in any of their works, one could fairly say that De Morgan, Peirce, Schröder, and Tarski were studying and axiomatizing some of its properties, and that Routley and Meyer were axiomatizing U directly, through various choices of postulates for relevant model structures. In any case, U lurks in the background-any randomly chosen finite relevant model structure is almost certain to have any particular equational property of U fixed in advance.
Perhaps U would be a good example of a relevant model structure, for in the theory of relation algebras, its complex algebra Re(U ) is the prototypical example. One advantage is that if worlds are pairs and R is determined by (triples) or something similar, then R need not be explicitly mentioned in the truth condition. For example, [26] says, "Like the semantics of modal logic, the semantics of relevance logic relativises truth of formulae to worlds. But Routley and Meyer go modal logic one better and use a three-place relation on worlds. . . . Their truth condition for A → B on this semantics is the following:
A → B is true at a world a if and only if for all worlds b and c such that Rabc (R is the accessibility relation) either A is false at b or B is true at c.
For people new to the field it takes some time to get used to this truth condition."
If worlds are pairs ab and R is the set of triples of the form (ab, ca, cb), then the truth condition becomes A → B is true at a world ab if and only if for all worlds ca and cb, either A is false at ca or B is true at cb. This truth condition on pairs validates all the axioms of R that do not need density or commutativity. The real worlds are the identity pairs aa, while the possible worlds (where A ∧ ∼A can hold) are the diversity pairs ab with a = b.
